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There is increasing evidence from response time experiments that language statistics and
perceptual simulations both play a role in conceptual processing. In an EEG experiment we
compared neural activity in cortical regions commonly associated with linguistic process-
ing and visual perceptual processing to determine to what extent symbolic and embodied
accounts of cognition applied. Participants were asked to determine the semantic rela-
tionship of word pairs (e.g., sky – ground ) or to determine their iconic relationship (i.e., if
the presentation of the pair matched their expected physical relationship). A linguistic bias
was found toward the semantic judgment task and a perceptual bias was found toward
the iconicity judgment task. More importantly, conceptual processing involved activation
in brain regions associated with both linguistic and perceptual processes. When compar-
ing the relative activation of linguistic cortical regions with perceptual cortical regions, the
effect sizes for linguistic cortical regions were larger than those for the perceptual cortical
regions early in a trial with the reverse being true later in a trial. These results map upon
findings from other experimental literature and provide further evidence that processing of
concept words relies both on language statistics and on perceptual simulations, whereby
linguistic processes precede perceptual simulation processes.
Keywords: embodied cognition, symbolic cognition, symbol interdependency, perceptual simulation, language
processing, EEG
INTRODUCTION
Conceptual processing elicits perceptual simulations. For instance,
when people read the word pair sky – ground, one word presented
above the other, processing is faster when sky appears above ground
than when the words are presented in the reversed order (Zwaan
and Yaxley, 2003; Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010).
Embodiment theorists have interpreted this finding as evidence
that perceptual and biomechanical processes underlie cognition
(Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999). Indeed, numerous studies show
that processing is affected by tasks that invoke the consideration
of perceptual features (see Pecher and Zwaan, 2005; De Vega et al.,
2008; Semin and Smith, 2008; for overviews). Much of this evi-
dence comes from behavioral response time (RT) experiments, but
there is also evidence stemming from neuropsychological studies
(Buccino et al., 2005; Kan et al., 2003; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010).
This embodied cognition account is oftentimes presented in con-
trast to a symbolic cognition account that suggests conceptual
representations are formed from statistical linguistic frequencies
(Landauer and Dumais, 1997). Such a symbolic cognition account
that uses the mind-as-a-computer metaphor has occasionally been
dismissed by embodiment theorists (Van Dantzig et al., 2008).
Recently, researchers have cautioned pitting one account
against another, demonstrating that symbolic and embodied cog-
nition accounts can be integrated (Barsalou et al., 2008; Louw-
erse, 2008, 2011; Simmons et al., 2008). For instance, Louwerse
(2011) proposed the Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, arguing
that language encodes embodied relations which language users
can use as a shortcut during conceptual processing. The relative
importance of language statistics and perceptual simulation in
conceptual processing depends on several variables, including the
type of stimulus presented to a participant, and the cognitive task
the participant is asked to perform (Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010).
Louwerse and Connell (2011) further found that the effects for
language statistics on processing times temporally preceded the
effects of perceptual simulations on processing times, with fuzzy
regularities in linguistic context being used for quick decisions and
precise perceptual simulations being used for slower decisions.
Importantly, these studies do not deny the importance of percep-
tual processes. In fact, individual effects for perceptual simulations
were also seen early on in a trial, however, when comparing the
effect sizes of language statistics and perceptual simulations,Louw-
erse and Connell (2011) found evidence for early linguistic and late
perceptual simulation processes.
The results from these RT studies, however, only indirectly
demonstrate that language statistics and perceptual simulation are
active during cognition, because the effects are modulated by hand
movements and RTs. Although such methods are methodologi-
cally valid, we sought to establish whether such conclusions were
also supported by neurological evidence.
In the current paper our objective was to determine when con-
ceptual processing uses neurological processes best explained by
language statistics relative to neurological processes best explained
by perceptual simulations. Given the evidence that both statisti-
cal linguistic frequencies and perceptual simulation are involved
in conceptual processing (Louwerse, 2008; Simmons et al., 2008;
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010), and that the effect for language
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statistics outperforms the effect for perceptual simulations for fast
RTs, with the opposite being true for slower RTs (Louwerse and
Connell, 2011), we predicted that cortical regions commonly asso-
ciated with linguistic processing, when compared with activation
in cortical regions commonly associated with perceptual simula-
tion, would be activated relatively early in a RT trial. Conversely,
when compared with activation in cortical regions commonly
associated with linguistic processing, cortical regions associated
with perceptual simulation were predicted to show greater activ-
ity relatively later in a RT trial. Further, we predicted activation
would be modified by the cognitive task, such that perceptual
cortical regions would be more active in a perceptual simulation
task, whereas linguistic cortical regions would be more active in a
semantic judgment task.
Traditional EEG methodologies are not quite sufficient to
answer this research question. For instance, event-related potential
(ERP) methods only allow for analyses of time-locked components
that activate in response to specific events over numerous trials
(Collins et al., 2011; Hald et al., 2011). EEG recordings combined
with magnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings can provide
high-resolution temporal information and spatial estimates of
neural activity, provided that appropriate source reconstruction
techniques are used (Hauk et al., 2008). However, this technique
establishes whether and when cortical regions are activated, but
does not answer the question of what cortical regions are acti-
vated in relation to each other. Such a comparative analysis seems
to call for a different and novel method.
We utilized source localization techniques in conjunction with
statistical analyses to determine when and where relative effects of
linguistic and perceptual processes occurred. We did this by inves-
tigating which regions of the cortex are responsible for activity
throughout the time course of each trial. However, source localiza-
tion determines only where differences emerge between conditions
at specific points in time; our goal was to determine whether
relatively stronger early effects of linguistic processes preceded a
relatively stronger later simulation process. Consequently, we used
established source localization techniques (Pascual-Marqui, 2002)
to determine where differences in activation were present during
an early versus a late time period. With that information we then
ran a mixed effects model on electrode activation throughout the
duration of a trial to identify the effect size for activation of lin-
guistic versus perceptual cortical regions over time. This type of
analysis is progressive in that it allowed us not only to determine
that activation differed between linguistic and perceptual cortical
regions but also allowed us to gain insight into the relative effect
size of language statistics and perceptual simulation as they con-




Thirty-three University of Memphis undergraduate students par-
ticipated for extra credit in a psychology course. All participants
had normal or corrected vision and were native English speakers.
Fifteen participants were randomly assigned to the semantic judg-
ment condition, and 18 participants were randomly assigned to
the iconicity judgment condition.
MATERIALS
Each condition consisted of 64 iconic/reverse-iconic word pairs
extracted from previous research (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and
Jeuniaux, 2010; see Appendix). Thirty-two pairs with an iconic
relationship were presented vertically on the screen in the same
order they would appear in the world (i.e., sky appears above
ground). Likewise, 32 pairs with a reverse-iconic relationship
appeared in an order opposite of that which would be expected in
the world (i.e., ground appears above sky). The remaining 128 tri-
als contained filler word pairs that had no iconic relationship. Half
of the fillers had a high semantic relation (cos= 0.55) and half
had a low semantic relation (cos= 0.21), as determined by latent
semantic analysis (LSA), a statistical, corpus-based, technique for
estimating semantic similarities on a scale of −1 to 1 (Landauer
et al., 2007). All items were counterbalanced such that all partici-
pants saw all word pairs, but no participant saw the same word pair
in both orders (i.e., both the iconic and the reverse-iconic order
for the experimental items).
EQUIPMENT
An Emotiv EPOC headset (Emotiv Systems Inc., San Francisco,
CA, USA) was used to record electroencephalograph data. EEG
data recorded from the Emotiv EPOC headset is comparable to
data recorded by traditional EEG devices (Bobrov et al., 2011; Styt-
senko et al., 2011). For instance, patterns of brain activity from a
study in which participants imagined pictures were comparable
between the 16-channel Emotiv EPOC system and the 32-channel
ActiCap system (Brain Products, Munich, Germany; Bobrov et al.,
2011). The Emotiv EPOC is also able to reliably capture P300
signals (Ramírez-Cortes et al., 2010; Duvinage et al., 2012), even
though the accuracy of high-end systems is superior.
The headset was fitted with 14 Au-plated contact-grade hard-
ened BeCu felt-tipped electrodes that were saturated in a saline
solution. Although the headset used a dry electrode system, such
technology has shown to be comparable to traditional wet elec-
trode systems (Estepp et al., 2009). The headset used sequential
sampling at 2048 Hz and was down-sampled to 128 Hz. The
incoming signal was automatically notch filtered at 50 and 60 Hz
using a 5th order sinc notch filter. The resolution was 1.95µV.
PROCEDURE
In both the semantic judgment and iconicity judgment conditions,
word pairs were presented vertically on an 800× 600 computer
screen. In the semantic judgment condition, participants were
asked to determine whether a word pair was related in mean-
ing. In the iconicity judgment condition, participants were asked
whether a word pair appeared in an iconic relationship (i.e., if a
word pair appeared in the same configuration as the pair would
occur in the world). Participants responded to stimuli by press-
ing designated yes or no keys on a number pad. Participants were
instructed to move and blink as little as possible. Word pairs were
randomly presented for each participant in order to negate any
order effects. To ensure participants understood the task, a session
of five practice trials preceded the experimental session.
RESULTS
We followed prior research (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and Jeuni-
aux, 2010) in identifying errors and outliers. As in those studies,
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error rates were expected to be high in both the semantic judg-
ment task and the iconicity task. Although some word pairs may
share a low semantic relation according to LSA, sometimes for
at least one word meaning, a higher semantic relationship might
be warranted (see Louwerse et al., 2006). For example, according
to LSA, rib and spinach has a low semantic relation (cos= 0.07),
but in one meaning of rib (that of barbecue) such a low semantic
relation is not justified (Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010). For the
semantic judgment task, error rates were unsurprisingly approx-
imately 25% (M = 26.07, SD= 7.51). Similarly, for the iconicity
judgment condition, error performance can also be explained by
the task. Priest and flag are not assumed to have an iconic relation,
even though such a relation could be imagined. Error rates were
around 25–30% (M = 29, SD= 8.53). For both the semantic judg-
ment condition and the iconicity judgment condition, these error
rates were comparable with those reported elsewhere (Louwerse
and Jeuniaux, 2010). Analyses of the errors revealed no evidence
for a speed-accuracy trade-off. In the RT analysis, data from each
subject whose RTs fell more than 2.5 SD from the mean per con-
dition, per subject, were removed from the analysis, affecting less
than 3% of the data in both experiments.
A mixed effects regression analysis was conducted on RTs with
order (sky above ground or ground above sky) as a fixed fac-
tor and participants and items as random factors (Richter, 2006;
Baayen et al., 2008). F-test denominator degrees of freedom for
RTs were estimated using the Kenward–Roger’s degrees of free-
dom adjustment to reduce the chances of Type I error (Littell
et al., 2002). For the semantic judgment condition,differences were
found between the iconic and the reverse-iconic word pairs F(1,
2683.75)= 3.7, p= 0.05, with iconic word pairs being responded
to faster than reverse-iconic word pairs, M = 1592.92, SE= 160.46
versus M = 1640.06, SE= 159.8. A similar result was obtained
for the iconicity judgment condition, F(1, 3332.39)= 13.58,
p< 0.001, again with iconic word pairs being responded to faster
than reverse-iconic word pairs, M = 1882.87, SE= 155.43 versus
M = 1980.80, SE= 154.67. This RT advantage has been reported
elsewhere (Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003; Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and
Jeuniaux, 2010). What is not clear from these results is whether
this effect can be explained by an embodied cognition account
(iconicity through perceptual simulations), by a symbolic cogni-
tion account (word-order frequency), or by both. As in Louwerse
and Jeuniaux (2010) language statistics and perceptual simulations
were operationalized using word-order frequency and iconicity
ratings.
ORDER FREQUENCY
Language statistics were operationalized as the log frequency of a-b
(e.g., sky – ground) and b-a (e.g., ground – sky) order of word pairs
(cf. Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010; Louwerse and
Connell, 2011). The order frequency of all 64 word pairs within 3–
5 word grams was obtained using the large Web 1T 5-gram corpus
(Brants and Franz, 2006).
ICONICITY RATINGS
Twenty-four participants at the University of Memphis estimated
the likelihood that concepts appeared above one another in the
real world. Ratings were made for 64 word pairs on a scale of
1–6, with 1 being extremely unlikely and 6 being extremely likely.
Each participant saw all word pairs, but whether a participant saw
a word pair in an iconic or a reverse iconic order was counter-
balanced such that each participant saw iconic and reverse-iconic
word pairs, but no participant saw a word pair both in an iconic
and a reverse-iconic order. High interrater reliability was found in
both groups (Group A: average r = 0.76, p< 0.001, n= 64; Group
B: average r = 0.74, p< 0.001, n= 64), with a negative correlation
between the two groups (average r =−0.72, p< 0.001, n= 64).
A mixed effects regression was conducted on RTs with order fre-
quencies and iconicity ratings as fixed factors and participants and
items as random factors. For the semantic judgment condition, a
mixed effects regression showed that statistical linguistic frequen-
cies significantly predicted RTs, F(1, 760.86)= 24.95, p< 0.001,
with higher frequencies yielding faster RTs. Iconicity ratings did
not yield a significant relation with RT, F(1, 762.09)= 0.46, p= 0.5
(see the first two bars in Figure 1; Table 1).
RESPONSE TIMES
For the iconicity judgment condition, a mixed effects regression
showed statistical linguistic frequencies again significantly pre-
dicted RT, F(1, 945.78)= 5.03, p= 0.03, with higher frequencies
yielding faster RTs. Iconicity ratings also yielded a significant rela-
tion with RT, F(1, 947.65)= 5.61, p= 0.02, with higher iconicity
ratings yielding lower RTs (see the second two bars in Figure 1;
Table 1).
Figure 1 shows that statistical linguistic frequencies explained
RTs in both the semantic judgment and the iconicity judgment
conditions, but the effect was stronger in the semantic judgment
than in the iconicity judgment condition. Figure 1 and Table 1
also show the opposite results for perceptual simulation in that
during the semantic judgment condition, the effect of perceptual
simulation on RT was limited (and not significant). However, in
the iconicity judgment condition, perceptual simulation was sig-








FIGURE 1 | Strength of the mixed effects regressions on the RTs in
absolute t -values for each of the two conditions for linguistic (order
frequency) and perceptual (iconicity ratings) factors. Asterisks mark
significant strengths (p<0.05) of relationship with RTs.
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Table 1 | Regression coefficients for the semantic judgment and iconicity judgment RT experiment.
variables Estimate (SE) t (df ) CI lower CI upper
Semantic judgment Intercept 2020.25 (192.11) 10.52 (37.85)** 1631.29 2409.21
Language statistics −62.12 (12.44) −4.99 (760.86)** −86.54 −37.71
Iconicity ratings 14.16 (20.97) 0.68 (762.09) −27.01 55.34
Iconicity judgment Intercept 2242.95 (185.94) 12.06 (46.41)** 1868.75 2617.15
Language statistics −27.50 (12.26) −2.24 (945.78)* −51.55 −3.44
Iconicity ratings −48.79 (20.60) −2.37 (947.65)* −89.21 −8.36
Note. Dependent variable is response time; **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
(semantic versus iconic) was significant, F(2, 1005.05)= 15.88,
p< 0.001, as was the interaction for perceptual simulation and
condition, F(2, 1634.20)= 2.9, p= 0.05. Indeed, the overall inter-
action between factors (linguistic and perceptual) and condition
was significant, F(2, 1540.18)= 8.10, p< 0.001.
These findings replicate the RT data in Louwerse and Jeuni-
aux (2010). That is, order frequency better explained RTs than the
iconicity ratings did in the semantic judgment task, but iconicity
ratings better explained RTs than the order frequency did in the
iconicity judgment task.
EEG ACTIVATION
As discussed earlier, we utilized previously established EEG source
localization techniques in conjunction with statistical analyses to
determine when and where relative effects of linguistic and percep-
tual processes occurred. Continuous neural activity was recorded
from 14 international 10–20 sites (AF3, F7, F3, FC5, T7, P7, O1, O2,
P8, T8, FC6, F4, F8, and AF4; Reilly, 2005, p. 139). Scalp record-
ings were referenced to CMS/DRL (P3/P4) locations. All electrode
impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. As the Emotiv EPOC head-
set is noisier than high-end systems, to minimize oculomotor,
motor, and electrogalvanic artifacts, a high-pass hardware filter
removed signals below 0.16 Hz and a low-pass filter removed sig-
nals above 30 Hz (see Bobrov et al., 2011 and Duvinage et al.,
2012 for similar filtering ranges with the Emotiv EPOC head-
set). The EEG was sampled at 2048 Hz and was down-sampled
to 128 Hz. Gross eye blink and movement artifacts over 150µV
were excluded from the analysis. All data were wirelessly collected
via a proprietary Bluetooth USB chip operating in the same fre-
quency range as the headset (2.4 GHz). Data were recorded using
Emotiv Testbench software (Emotiv Systems, Inc., San Francisco,
CA, USA).
Data were filtered using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004),
an open-source toolbox for MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc., Natick,
MA, USA). Independent component analyses were implemented
using ADJUST, an algorithm that automatically identifies stereo-
typed temporal and spatial artifacts (Mognon et al., 2010). Any
remaining oculomotor or motor activity was visually identified
and removed from the dataset.
On average, subjects took 1809 ms to process and respond to
the words presented on the screen. Therefore the sLORETA pack-
age (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) was used to localize general activity at
an early (97–291 ms) and a late (1551–1744 ms) time interval (as
we predicted linguistic processes would precede perceptual sim-
ulation) in both conditions. The early time period began shortly
after presentation of the stimuli and the late time period began
shortly before the subject response. LORETA used the MNI152
template (Fuchs et al., 2002) to compute a non-parametric topo-
graphical analysis of variance comparing differences between two
maps of averaged cortical activity over each time period (Strik
et al., 1998). The topographies significantly differed between con-
ditions at early, p< 0.01, and late, p< 0.01, intervals, with the
maximum source for the early time period being found around
the left inferior frontal gyrus (iFG; near electrode sites FC5, F7,
and T7) and the maximum source for the late time period being
found near the lingual gyrus (near electrode sites O1, O2, P7, and
P8). As source localization with EEG poorly maps anatomical cor-
relates to function, these sites are obviously approximations of
the relevant underlying cortical regions (Nunez and Srinivasan,
2005). Note we are not attempting to pinpoint exact regions of
neural activity at a given time but instead we are simply attempt-
ing to compare general estimates of neural activity in early versus
late processing (i.e., we would like to determine when processing
occurs in more linguistic versus in more perceptual regions over
the duration of a trial).
Although neural processes are quite distributed and bilater-
ally activate multiple cortical regions (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009;
Bressler and Menon, 2010), there is considerable agreement that
specific regions (such as the left iFG and left superior tempo-
ral gyrus (STG) consistently show increased activation during
language processing (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Papathanassiou,
2000; Blank et al., 2002; De Carli et al., 2007). The same applies to
visual perception and visual imagery processes, which bilaterally
activate multiple cortical regions, in particular occipital and pari-
etal lobes (Kosslyn et al., 1993, 1999; Alivisatos and Petrides, 1996).
Further, visual imagery of words activates these same regions that
process incoming perceptual information (Ganis et al., 2004).
Reichle et al. (2000) used fMRI to demonstrate that when told
to rely on visual imagery while processing linguistic information,
subjects were more likely to show increased activation in pari-
etal lobes. As expected, when asked to rely on verbal strategies,
activation in traditional language processing regions dominated.
Finally, in an fMRI study, Simmons et al. (2008) found that when
asked to generate situations in which a word might occur, sub-
jects showed increased activity in the cuneus, precuneus, posterior
cingulate gyrus, retrospinal cortex, and lateral parietal cortex.
However, when asked to participate in a word association task,
activation occurred in language processing regions of the brain,
specifically the lateral left iFG and the medial inferior frontal. Dur-
ing early conceptual processing (first 7.5 s of a 15 s trial), activation
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was similar to that of the word association task (i.e., these same
language processing areas were active). This is consistent with
our output from sLORETA in that during early processing, the
maximum source was also the left iFG. Unlike early processing,
Simmons et al. (2008) found that late conceptual processing (last
7.5 s of a 15 s trial) resulted in activation of the precuneus, poste-
rior cingulate gyrus, and the right lateral parietal cortex (regions
all closest to electrodes P7, P8, O1, and O2), the same regions active
during situation generation. Although our sLORETA source local-
ization indicated that the maximum source for our late time period
was near the lingual gyrus, this region is also in closest proximity
to electrode sites P7, P8, O1, and O2.
Figure 2 shows the activation for a participant averaged across
all trials in 100 ms increments. A relatively localized increase in
activation in linguistic processing regions began almost imme-
diately after a stimulus was presented. Around the middle of the
trial, the activation dispersed from the linguistic processing regions
toward perceptual processing regions. Late in the trial, localized
activation was relatively greater in perceptual processing regions.
This pattern matches the conclusions drawn by Louwerse and
Connell (2011) on the basis of RT data and the results obtained
through sLORETA, that linguistic processes precede perceptual
processes.
To complement the pattern observed in Figure 2 in both our
RT data and in the sLORETA results, we performed a mixed effects
regression on electrode activation. We assigned the linguistic cor-
tical regions, as determined by sLORETA localization, a dummy
value of 1, and we assigned the perceptual cortical regions, as
determined by sLORETA localization, a dummy value of 2. We
used electrode activation as our dependent variable, and partici-
pant, item, and receptor as random factors. The reason we used
individual receptors as random factors was to rule out strong
effects that could be observed for one receptor but not for oth-
ers within the regions commonly associated with linguistic or
perceptual processing. With this analysis, our objective was to
determine to what extent linguistic or perceptual cortical regions
overall showed increased activation throughout the trial. As in
the previous analyses, F-test denominator degrees of freedom for
the dependent variable were estimated using the Kenward–Roger’s
degrees of freedom adjustment.
-3000 ms -2900 ms -2800 ms -2700 ms -2600 ms -2500 ms
-2400 ms -2300 ms -2200 ms -2100 ms -2000 ms -1900 ms
-1800 ms -1700 ms -1600 ms -1500 ms -1400 ms -1300 ms
-1200 ms -1100 ms -1000 ms -900 ms -800 ms -700 ms






FIGURE 2 | Cortical activation throughout a trial. Presentation of the experimental stimulus (i.e., word pair) starts at −2800 ms.
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For the semantic judgment condition, a significant difference
was observed between linguistic and perceptual cortical regions,
F(1, 1153108.58)= 46.70, p< 0.001. A similar pattern was found
for the iconicity judgment condition, F(1, 1464148.76)= 24.07,
p< 0.001. The fact that a difference was observed is perhaps unin-
teresting; differences between linguistic and perceptual regions
are expected. Instead, the direction of the effect is important
here. Recall that linguistic regions were dummy coded as 1, and
perceptual regions were dummy coded as 2. Positive t -values
would indicate that perceptual regions dominate, and negative
t -values would indicate that linguistic regions dominate. Based
on the findings in the RT analysis reported above, we predicted
that linguistic regions would dominate in both the semantic and
iconicity task, and more so in the semantic judgment task than
in the iconicity judgment task. This prediction is supported by
the results; t -values in both the semantic and iconicity tasks
were negative, as predicted with higher t -values in the seman-
tic task, t (1153109)=−6.83, p< 0.001, than in the iconicity task,
t (1464149)=−4.91, p< 0.001, replicating the RT findings.
To determine whether linguistic processes precede perceptual
simulation processes, we created 20 time bins for each trial per
participant, per condition (cf. Louwerse and Bangerter, 2010).
Each time bin was therefore approximately 80 ms for the semantic
judgment condition and 95 ms for the iconicity judgment condi-
tion. Twenty time bins allowed for the largest number of groups
for examining trends of each factor while retaining sufficient data
points per participant to test the time course hypotheses. Mixed
effects models were again run, now with time bin as an added
predictor in the model. The t -values of the mixed effects mod-
els per time bin are shown in Figure 3A, Tables 2 and 3. The
figure shows that t -values in both the semantic judgment and
the iconicity judgment experiments are predominantly negative
in the first half of the trial (suggesting a bias toward cortical
regions associated with linguistic processing), and predominantly
positive toward the end of the trial (suggesting a bias toward cor-
tical regions associated with perceptual processing). Note here
that these are the relative effect sizes for the two clusters of
cortical regions (FC5, F7, and T7) and (O1, O2, P7, and P8),
with the effects for individual electrodes filtered out. The find-
ings do not show low activation for the perceptual processing
areas early on in the trial (as words must of course be recog-
nized by the visual system during processing); these results merely
show that, relative to the brain regions associated with linguis-
tic processing, the effect sizes of perceptual processing regions
dominate later in the trial. Also note the relative effect for brain
regions associated with perceptual processing very early in the
trial (time bins 1–4), perhaps in line with the early activation
of perceptual simulations (Hauk et al., 2008; Pulvermüller et al.,
2009).
To further demonstrate the neurological evidence for relatively
earlier linguistic processes and relatively later perceptual simula-
tion, we fitted the t -test values for the 20 time bins using expo-
nential, power law, and growth models. The fit of the sinusoidal
curve was superior to these models across the two data conditions.
Figure 3B presents the fit, the standard errors, and the values for
the four variables. The sinusoidal fit converged in four iterations
(iconicity task) and five iterations (semantic task) to a tolerance
of 0.00001.
Using the sinusoidal model and the parameters derived from
the data, the following figure emerged (Figure 3B). For both the
semantic judgment and the iconicity judgment conditions, linguis-
tic cortical regions dominated initially, followed later by perceptual
cortical regions. As Figure 3B clearly shows, activation in lin-
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FIGURE 3 | (A) t -values for each of the 20 time bins for both the
semantic judgment and iconicity judgment conditions. Negative t -values
represent a relative bias toward linguistic cortical regions, positive
t -values represent a relative bias toward perceptual cortical regions. (B)
t -values for each of the 20 time bins for both the semantic judgment and
iconicity judgment conditions fitted using a sinusoidal curve model and
correlation coefficients, standard errors, and parameter coefficients for
the sinusoidal model, y= a+b× cos (cx+d). Negative t -values
represent a relative bias toward linguistic cortical regions, positive
t -values represent a relative bias toward perceptual cortical regions.
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Table 2 | Regression coefficients semantic judgment task EEG experiment.
Time bin variables Estimate (SE) t (df ) CI lower CI upper
1 Intercept −1.14 (2.45) −0.47 (20.77) −6.23 3.95
Ling.-perc. bias −4.71 (0.73) −6.41 (66071.42)** −6.15 −3.27
2 Intercept −1.30 (2.51) −0.52 (21.64) −6.51 3.90
Ling.-perc. bias −5.34 (0.76) −7.04 (65935.04)** −6.83 −3.85
3 Intercept 0.34 (2.85) 0.12 (37.32) −5.44 6.11
Ling.-perc. bias −5.52 (0.75) −7.36 (66088.74)** −6.99 −4.05
4 Intercept 0.19 (1.93) 0.10 (25.32) −3.79 4.16
Ling.-perc. bias −4.40 (0.71) −6.21 (65996.83)** −5.79 −3.01
5 Intercept −0.29 (1.44) −0.20 (27.58) −3.25 2.67
Ling.-perc. bias −3.07 (0.69) −4.45 (65100.18)** −4.42 −1.72
6 Intercept −0.99 (1.37) −0.72 (32.15) −3.78 1.80
Ling.-perc. bias −3.00 (0.69) −4.35 (66873.74)** −4.35 −1.65
7 Intercept 0.39 (1.33) 0.29 (31.12) −2.32 3.11
Ling.-perc. bias −3.53 (0.68) −5.16 (66148.30)** −4.87 −2.19
8 Intercept 2.89 (1.22) 2.36 (32.04)* 0.40 5.38
Ling.-perc. bias −5.69 (0.68) −8.39 (66364.66)** −7.02 −4.36
9 Intercept 2.96 (1.04) 2.84 (43.87)** 0.86 5.06
Ling.-perc. bias −5.85 (0.67) −8.78 (65944.93)** −7.16 −4.54
10 Intercept 2.50 (1.21) 2.07 (31.56)* 0.04 4.97
Ling.-perc. bias −4.07 (0.67) −6.03 (65120.78)** −5.39 −2.74
11 Intercept 2.29 (1.26) 1.82 (31.59) −0.28 4.86
Ling.-perc. bias −3.42 (0.68) −5.04 (67761.30)** −4.75 −2.09
12 Intercept 0.10 (1.13) 0.09 (32.78) −2.20 2.40
Ling.-perc. bias −0.69 (0.69) −1.00 (65801.13) −2.05 0.67
13 Intercept −0.43 (1.14) −0.38 (30.18) −2.77 1.90
Ling.-perc. bias 0.52 (0.67) 0.77 (66336.68) −0.80 1.84
14 Intercept 0.32 (1.00) 0.32 (48.81) −1.69 2.33
Ling.-perc. bias 0.96 (0.68) 1.43 (66148.68) −0.36 2.29
15 Intercept 1.45 (1.22) 1.19 (35.46) −1.02 3.92
Ling.-perc. bias 0.98 (0.65) 1.53 (66886.19) −0.28 2.25
16 Intercept 2.21 (1.22) 1.80 (33.54) −0.28 4.70
Ling.-perc. bias 0.48 (0.66) 0.72 (65129.27) −0.82 1.77
17 Intercept 2.24 (1.40) 1.60 (27.42) −0.62 5.10
Ling.-perc. bias 0.15 (0.69) 0.22 (66049.58) −1.21 1.51
18 Intercept 2.20 (1.59) 1.39 (25.91) −1.06 5.46
Ling.-perc. bias 0.74 (0.72) 1.03 (66212.19) −0.66 2.14
19 Intercept 0.75 (1.84) 0.41 (20.99) −3.07 4.57
Ling.-perc. bias 2.74 (0.73) 3.75 (65647.68)** 1.31 4.17
20 Intercept 0.38 (1.80) 0.21 (20.48) −3.37 4.13
Ling.-perc. bias 2.44 (0.70) 3.49 (65735.49)** 1.07 3.81
Note. Dependent variable is EEG activation: negative t values indicate a bias toward linguistic cortical areas, positive t-values a bias toward perceptual cortical areas;
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
whereas activation in perceptual cortical regions was prominent in
the iconicity judgment task. Moreover, linguistic cortical regions
showed greater activation relatively early in the trial, whereas per-
ceptual cortical regions showed greater activation relatively late in
processing. The results from these analyses are in line with results
we obtained through both more commonly used source localiza-
tion techniques and RT analyses, but they give a more detailed
view of relative cortical activation for linguistic and perceptual
processes throughout each trial.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this experiment was to neurologically determine
to what extent both linguistic and embodied explanations can be
used in conceptual processing. The results of a semantic judgment
and an iconicity judgment task demonstrated that both language
statistics and perceptual simulation explain conceptual processing.
Specifically, statistical linguistic frequencies best explain semantic
judgment tasks, whereas iconicity ratings better explain iconicity
judgment tasks. Our results also showed that linguistic cortical
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Table 3 | Regression coefficients iconicity judgment EEG experiment.
Time bin variables Estimate (SE) t (df ) CI lower CI upper
1 Intercept 0.58 (1.23) 0.47 (27.25) −1.94 3.09
Ling.-perc. bias −0.34 (0.54) −0.63 (86498.15) −1.41 0.72
2 Intercept 0.86 (1.36) 0.63 (27.96) −1.92 3.64
Ling.-perc. bias −0.01 (0.55) −0.02 (86822.04) −1.09 1.07
3 Intercept −0.07 (1.30) −0.05 (29.12) −2.73 2.59
Ling.-perc. bias 2.14 (0.62) 3.47 (86759.75)** 0.93 3.34
4 Intercept 0.99 (1.41) 0.70 (28.46) −1.89 3.87
Ling.-perc. bias −2.48 (0.61) −4.10 (87120.52)** −3.67 −1.29
5 Intercept 0.85 (2.03) 0.42 (21.39) −3.37 5.06
Ling.-perc. bias −3.20 (0.60) −5.37 (85757.91)** −4.37 −2.03
6 Intercept 1.65 (1.89) 0.87 (23.25) −2.25 5.56
Ling.-perc. bias −4.25 (0.57) −7.43 (87672.08)** −5.37 −3.13
7 Intercept 0.75 (1.88) 0.40 (22.18) −3.14 4.64
Ling.-perc. bias −2.79 (0.55) −5.03 (87008.84)** −3.87 −1.70
8 Intercept 1.52 (1.11) 1.38 (46.84) −0.71 3.76
Ling.-perc. bias −0.74 (0.54) −1.36 (86591.37) −1.80 0.33
9 Intercept 1.54 (1.43) 1.08 (25.22) −1.40 4.48
Ling.-perc. bias −0.88 (0.49) −1.79 (86759.15) −1.84 0.08
10 Intercept 3.21 (1.20) 2.66 (29.05)* 0.75 5.67
Ling.-perc. bias −3.16 (0.52) −6.11 (85320.16)** −4.18 −2.15
11 Intercept 3.07 (0.94) 3.28 (61.11)** 1.20 4.94
Ling.-perc. bias −0.51 (0.49) −1.03 (87746.70) −1.47 0.46
12 Intercept 2.91 (1.72) 1.69 (22.63) −0.65 6.47
Ling.-perc. bias 1.28 (0.53) 2.43 (86582.36)* 0.25 2.31
13 Intercept 3.99 (2.18) 1.83 (20.53) −0.55 8.52
Ling.-perc. bias −0.16 (0.53) −0.30 (87051.02) −1.21 0.89
14 Intercept 1.16 (1.07) 1.09 (50.98) −0.98 3.31
Ling.-perc. bias 0.49 (0.53) 0.93 (86359.82) −0.54 1.52
15 Intercept −0.36 (1.13) −0.32 (54.91) −2.63 1.90
Ling.-perc. bias 1.71 (0.49) 3.48 (87276.97)** 0.75 2.67
16 Intercept −0.87 (1.34) −0.65 (27.95) −3.60 1.87
Ling.-perc. bias 3.60 (0.51) 7.03 (85655.56)** 2.59 4.60
17 Intercept −3.17 (1.48) −2.14 (25.29)* −6.22 −0.13
Ling.-perc. bias 4.89 (0.53) 9.24 (87200.29)** 3.85 5.93
18 Intercept −4.84 (2.33) −2.08 (19.25) −9.71 0.04
Ling.-perc. bias 4.46 (0.50) 8.90 (87181.78)** 3.48 5.45
19 Intercept −4.17 (2.52) -1.66 (18.41) −9.45 1.11
Ling.-perc. bias 3.64 (0.49) 7.39 (87015.12)** 2.67 4.61
20 Intercept −2.80 (0.94) −2.99 (41.90)** −4.68 −0.91
Ling.-perc. bias 5.51 (0.52) 10.62 (85437.82)** 4.49 6.52
Note. Dependent variable is EEG activation: negative t values indicate a bias toward linguistic cortical areas, positive t-values a bias toward perceptual cortical areas;
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.
regions tended to be relatively more active overall during the
semantic task, and perceptual cortical regions tended to be rel-
atively more active during the iconicity task. Moreover, on any
given trial, neural activation progressed from language process-
ing cortical regions toward perceptual processing cortical regions.
These findings support the conclusion that conceptual processing
is both linguistic and embodied, both in early and late processing,
however when comparing the relative effect of linguistic processes
versus perceptual simulation processes, the former precedes the
latter (see also Louwerse and Connell, 2011).
Standard EEG methods, such as ERP, are extremely valuable
when identifying whether a difference in cortical activation can
be obtained for different stimuli. The drawback of these tradi-
tional methods is that excessive stimulus repetition is required.
Moreover, ERP is useful in identifying whether an anomaly is
detected (Van Berkum et al., 1999) or whether a shift in percep-
tual simulation has taken place (Collins et al., 2011), but does not
sufficiently answer the question to what extent different cortical
regions are relatively more or less active than others. The tech-
nique shown here used source localization techniques to determine
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 385 | 8
Louwerse and Hutchinson Linguistic processes precede perceptual simulation
where differences in activation were present during early and late
processing. We then used that information to compare the relative
effect sizes of two clusters of cortical regions over the duration
of the trial. This method is novel, yet its findings match those
obtained from more traditional methods (Simmons et al., 2008;
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010; Louwerse and Connell, 2011). This
method obviously does not render fMRI unnecessary for local-
ization. In our analyses we compared the relative dominance of
different clusters of cortical regions (filtering out their individual
effects). Such a comparative technique does not allow for localiza-
tion of specific regions of the brain; it only allows for a comparison
of (predetermined) regions.
How can the findings reported in this paper be explained in
terms of the cognitive mechanisms involved in language process-
ing? We have argued elsewhere that language encodes percep-
tual relations (Louwerse, 2011). Speakers translate prelinguistic
conceptual knowledge into linguistic conceptualizations, so that
perceptual relations become encoded in language, with distribu-
tional language statistics building up as a function of language
use (Louwerse, 2008). Louwerse (2007, 2011) proposed the Sym-
bol Interdependency Hypothesis, which states that comprehension
relies both on statistical linguistic processes as well as perceptual
processes. Language users can ground linguistic units in perceptual
experiences (embodied cognition), but through language statistics
they can bootstrap meaning from linguistic units (symbolic cog-
nition). Iconicity relations between words (Louwerse, 2008), the
modality of a word (Louwerse and Connell, 2011), the valence
of a word (Hutchinson and Louwerse, 2012), the social relations
between individuals (Hutchinson et al., 2012), the relative location
of body parts (Tillman et al., 2012), and even the relative geo-
graphical location of city words (Louwerse and Benesh, 2012) can
be determined using language statistics. The meaning extracted
through language statistics is, however, shallow, but provides
good-enough representations. For a more precise understanding
of a linguistic unit, perceptual simulation is needed (Louwerse
and Connell, 2011). Depending on the stimulus (words or pic-
tures; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010), the cognitive task (Louwerse
and Jeuniaux, 2010; current study), and the time of processing
(Louwerse and Connell, 2011; current study) the relative effect of
language statistics or perceptual simulations dominates. The find-
ings reported in this paper support the Symbol Interdependency
Hypothesis, with the relative effect of the linguistic system being
more dominant in the early part of the trial and the relative effect
of the perceptual system dominating later in the trial.
The RT and EEG findings reported here are relevant for a better
understanding of the mechanisms involved in conceptual process-
ing. They are also relevant for a philosophy of science. Recently,
many studies have demonstrated that cognition is embodied, mov-
ing the symbolic and embodiment debate toward embodied cog-
nition. The history of the debate (De Vega et al., 2008) is, however,
reminiscent of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. In
this tale, a group of blind men each touch a different part of an ele-
phant in order to identify the animal, and when comparing their
findings learn that they fundamentally disagree because they fail
to see the whole picture. Evidence for embodied cognition is akin
to identifying the tusk of the elephant, and evidence for symbolic
cognition is similar to identifying its trunk. Dismissing or ignoring
either explanation is reminiscent of the last lines of a parable: “For,
quarreling,each to his view they cling. Such folk see only one side of
a thing” (Udana, 6.4). Cognition is both symbolic and embodied;
the important question now is under what conditions symbolic
and embodied explanations best explain experimental data. The
current study has provided RT and EEG evidence that both linguis-
tic and perceptual simulation processes play a role in conceptual
cognition, to different extents, depending on the cognitive task,
with linguistic processes preceding perceptual simulation.
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